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The treatment of employees in takeover situations
by Blanaid Clarke
The most obvious group to be affected by a takeover offer is the shareholders of the target company. Fortunately a plethora of regulation exists to ensure fairness and 
equality of treatment of shareholders in such situations. Another 
group that is likely to be substantially affected is the employees 
of the target company who will be concerned that the successful 
bidder will engage in cost-saving measures and that jobs will be 
lost. Even if employees retain their jobs, they may be concerned 
that their jobs will not be secure or their conditions of 
employment altered.
The latest draft 1 3th Directive on Company Law Concerning 
Takeover Bids (COM(97)565 final, OJ 1997 C378 ) strengthens 
the position of employees and imposes greater duties on 
directors to act in employees' interests and to provide them with 
information on the takeover. This article sets out to examine the 
current legal treatment of employees during corporate takeovers 
in Ireland with a view to determining whether implementation 
of this directive in Ireland would involve significant legislative oro o
policy changes.
TAKEOVER BIDS
The general purpose of the draft directive is to co-ordinate 
certain safeguards which member states require of companies for 
the protection of shareholders during takeover bids. Article 5(1) 
sets out five general principles which must be respected in the 
rules introduced by member states to implement the directive. 
One of these principles imposes a duty on the board of the target 
company 'to act in all the interests of the company, including 
employment'. The Company and Commercial Law Committee 
of the Law Society of Ireland have noted that this principle may 
cause difficulties where there is a conflict between the interests 
of the shareholders and the interests of the employees. Such a 
conflict would arise for example where a generous offer had 
been made to shareholders but in circumstances where the 
bidder made clear its intention to dismiss a large portion of the 
workforce following the acquisition. Modern corporate theory 
would appear to suggest that the claims of the shareholders 
should be paramount. Furthermore the committee point out 
that as the main focus of the draft directive is on protecting 
shareholders theirs would appear to be the overriding interest.
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Article 6 sets out the informational requirements to be 
complied with by member states in their rules. This article 
imposes obligations on member states to provide employees 
with certain relevant information. Article 6(1) states that as soon 
as the bid has been made public, the target's board must inform 
the representatives of its employees, or the employees
themselves if there are no representatives. In addition art. 6(2) 
requires that, when the offer document has been made public, 
the board communicate it to the employees' representatives or, 
where there are no representatives, to the employees. 
Article 6(3) sets out the minimum informational requirements 
to be included in the offer document. This document should 
contain inter alia details of the bidder's intentions with regard too
the future business and undertakings of the target, its employees 
and its management. The latest proposal requires that the 
document should also include any change in the conditions of 
employment.
THE IRISH TAKEOVER PANEL ACT & RULES
The Irish Takeover Panel, a statutorv body established by the 
Irish Takeover Panel Act, 1997, regulates all takeover offers for 
companies resident in the Republic of Ireland whose shares were 
listed or dealt in on the Irish Stock Exchange. The act sets the 
Irish panel two principal objects:
(1) to develop rules governing the conduct ,of takeovers and 
other relevant transactions; and
(2) to monitor and supervise takeovers and other relevant 
transactions in order to ensure compliance with the 
provisions of the act and the rules.
The act also sets out twelve general principles which apply to 
the conduct of takeovers. The Irish panel fulfilled its rule- 
making duty by introducing the Irish Takeover Panel Act 1997
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(Takeover) Rules 1997 and the Irish Takeover Panel Act 1997 
(Substantial Acquisition) Rules 1997. These rules mirror 
substantially the City Code and Rules Governing Substantial 
Acquisitions of Shares.
General principle no. 8 of the act states that when giving 
advice and furnishing information in relation to the offer theo
directors of the target company shall be bound 'to consider the 
interests of the shareholders as a whole'. General principle no. 9 
of the City Code upon which this principle is based, states that 
in giving advice to shareholders directors should 'consider theo o
shareholders' interests together with those of employees and 
creditors'. It would appear that the requirement to consider the 
interests of employees has been deliberately omitted from the 
Irish principles. Yet even the City Code does not go as far as the 
directive in requiring the directors of the target 
company to act in the interests of their employees. 
The City Code refers to considering employees' 
interests only when giving advice to shareholders. 
The difference could potentially be important. 
However, because the London Panel insists upon 
compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of 
the City Code, and given the flexibility involved in 
a self regulatory code, it is always open to the London Panel to 
require directors to act in the interests of employees. Such 
flexibility is clearly absent in the Irish statutory framework.
According to r. 24.1 of both the Irish Rules and the City Code, 
the bidder should include the following information in the offer 
document:
  its intentions regarding the continuation of the business of the 
target and its subsidiaries;
  its intentions regarding any major changes to be introduced in 
the business, including any redeployment of the fixed assets of 
the target and its subsidiaries;
  the long-term commercial justification of the offer; and
  its intentions with regard to the continued employment of the 
employees of the target and of its subsidiaries. 
Clearly when an offer document has been published, the 
employees will have direct access to the information contained 
therein. It will not be important that this information was not 
passed to them directly by the directors as required by the 
directive but was obtained by the employees independently. For 
this reason, Alistair Defriez, the Director-General of the London 
Panel, has described the provision in the directive as a 
'somewhat mystifying development'. It should also be noted that 
the informational requirements in r. 24 are not quite as far- 
reaching as those stipulated in the directive. Article 6(3) involves 
notifying employees of 'any change in the conditions of 
employment'. Such information would not necessarily be 
substantial enough to come under the heading of 'any major 
changes to be introduced in the business' and may not therefore 
be included in the offer document. Similarly, unless the changes 
in working conditions are so severe as to constitute constructiveo
dismissal they are unlikely to require inclusion in the offer 
document under the heading 'the continued employment' of the 
employees. The Company and Commercial Law Committee of 
the Law Society of Ireland have made the valid point that it 
would be difficult, if not impossible in the case of a hostile bid, 
for the bidder to give any indication of any changes in the 
conditions of employment in the target company as it is unlikely 
to be aware of such conditions.
EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS
The introduction to the City Code states that:
'the Code and the Panel operate principally to ensure Jair and equal 
treatment of all shareholders in relation to takeovers.'
Similarly the whole focus of the Irish Rules, implementing the 
general principles set out in the act, is on the protection of 
shareholders. When the then Minister of State at the 
Department of Enterprise & Employment, was questioned in 
the Irish Parliament about the lack of protection afforded by the 
act to workers, he pointed to 'its relatively narrow scope'. 
Interestingly, the Minister then went on to say that there was 
already existing legislation including European instruments 
which deal with the protection of the workers' interests in 
takeovers.
The transfer of undertakings directive
The Minister referred specifically to 'European instruments 
such as the transfer of undertakings'. The transfer of 
undertakings directive (No. 77/178, OJ 1977 L61/26) provides 
for the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of the 
transfer of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses. 
Although the original proposal dealt with 'the harmonisation of
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the legislation of member states on the retention of the rightso o
and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, takeovers 
and amalgamations', the directive, as introduced, only applies 
where there has been a transfer of an undertaking or part of an 
undertaking. It does not apply therefore where a limited 
company is taken over by the acquisition of its share capital. In
such circumstances, the regulations which implement this 
directive into Irish law will be of no use to employees.
The collective redundancies directive
The Protection of Employment Act 1977 implements in Ireland 
the directive on the approximation of the laws of member states 
relating to collective redundancies (Directive 75/129, OJ 1975 
L48/29). The act provides certain informational benefits to 
employees, where dismissals of a large proportion of the 
workforce in any period of 30 consecutive days are effected, for 
certain reasons stated in the act. A dismissal on the grounds of 
redundancy is included. The act stipulates that where an 
employer proposes to create collective redundancies it shall, 
with a view to reaching an agreement, consult with employees' 
representatives and supply them with all relevant information. 
This information should include the reasons for the proposed 
redundancies, the number of employees to be made redundant 
and the period during which it is proposed to effect the 
proposed redundancies. The consultations should include the 
possibility of avoiding the proposed redundancies, reducing the 
number to be made redundant or otherwise mitigating theiro o
consequences.
A number of problems render this legislation less than potent 
in safe-guarding employees' interests in a takeover such as:
  insider dealing restrictions may prevent the communication 
of information to employees at an early stage;
  consultation with the target company's management may be 
futile as they are unlikely to be in a position to control 
redundancies; and
  the maximum penalty for failing to initiate consultations is a 
fine of £500. This is unlikely to act as an adequate deterrent. 
In any case, the employer is offered a possibility- of mitigating 
this penalty by pleading 'substantial reasons related to his 
business which made it impracticable for him to comply with 
his obligations'. The necessity of maintaining the 
confidentiality of certain information may provide such an 
excuse.
The European Works Councils directive
The Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 
1996 implements in Ireland the European Works Councils 
directive (Directive 94/95, OJ 1994 L254/64). The directive 
requires the establishment of European Works Councils in large 
enterprises operating across two or more ELI countries. It also 
provides for the establishment of special negotiating bodies 
comprising representatives from the undertakings' operations in 
the countries concerned. The objective of the directive is to 
ensure that undertakings operating in more than one EU 
country inform and consult representatives of employees 
affected by their decisions. Although there is no specific 
reference to takeovers, decisions on the future prospects of the 
business could obviously be categorised as decisions affecting 
employees. Apart from the limited application of this act to 
employees in general, other difficulties would stem from the 
confidential nature of the information to be disclosed and the 
fact that, while the act ensures that employees are informed of 
major changes in employment, their ability to affect the 
decisions being made would seem slight.o o
COMPETITION LEGISLATION
Domestic competition law is covered by two pieces of 
legislation: the Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies (Control) Act 1978 31
32
and the Competition Act 1991. The 1978 act requires the prior 
approval of the Minister for Enterprise & Employment for 
takeovers of companies where at least one of the enterprises 
concerned carries on business in Ireland. Unless the Minister 
deems otherwise, the act only applies to companies which 
exceed certain size and turnover thresholds. Upon notification, 
the Minister may decide to refer the matter to the Competition 
Authority for investigation. The latter must state its opinion:
'as to whether or not the proposed merger or takeover concerned 
would be likely to prevent or restrict competition or restrain trade in any 
goods or services and would be likely to operate against the common 
good.'
In assessing the effect of the acquisition on 'the common 
good', the authority must give its views in respect of a set of 
listed criteria which includes the likely effect of the acquisition 
on the level of employment and on employees. However it must 
be noted that the question of the common good must be 
considered in terms of the promotion of competition. Once the 
Minister receives this report, he or she makes a decision based 
on his or her assessment of 'the exigencies of the common good'o o
which must again include the criteria listed in s. 8. It would thus 
seem that the Minister is obliged to balance the interests of the 
employees against other issues such as improving competition. 
Such protection may not be sufficient to allay the concerns of 
employees.
The Competition Act 1991 may also be relevant to takeovers. 
The purpose of the 1991 act is to prohibit anti-competitive 
agreements and practices and to prohibit the abuse of a 
dominant position. Unlike the 1978 act, there are no minimum 
si/e thresholds and title in the shares may pass to a bidder 
notwithstanding that the parties have not notified the 
Competition Authority of the acquisition. Section 4(1) prohibits 
agreements which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition in trade in any goods or 
services in the state. The Competition Authority has confirmed 
that before a merger or takeover can be found to have offended 
against s. 4(1):
'it must be shown that it would, or would be likely to, result in an 
actual diminution of competition in the market concerned.'
It would be difficult to see how a takeover agreement would 
fall within the scope of the s. 4(1) prohibition purely because it 
is contrary to the best interests of the employees. Similarly an 
argument that a company was abusing a dominant position 
contrary to s. 5(1) by acting contrary to the best interests of 
their employees would not appear sustainable.
One sense in which the interests of the employees may be 
indirectly protected under the 1991 act is indicated in the Barlo 
Group plc/Kingspan Group pic case. In a submission to the 
Competition Authority, the Minister for Enterprise and 
Employment indicated his concern that jobs should not be lost 
in the target company. He stated that the target had been losing 
money and that if the takeover did not proceed the jobs would 
be lost. The Competition Authority itself referred to the 'failing 
firm defence' noting that there was little prospect of the plant 
continuing in operation unless the acquisition proceeded. Its 
point was not that it was concerned by the potential job losses 
per se. Rather it felt that if the plant were to close the degree of 
market concentration would increase anyway and thus the 
takeover itself was not leading to a diminution in competition.
COMPANIES LEGISLATION
The only section in Irish company legislation which expressly 
requires companies to consider the interests of their employees 
is s. 52(1) of the Companies Act 1990. This section provides that 
the directors 'are to have regard in the performance of their 
functions [to] the interests of the company's employees in 
general' as well as the interests of its members. Although this 
would seem to be an extremely valuable right of employees, 
s. 52(2) minimises the benefit considerably. It states that the 
duty imposed on directors by this section:
'shall be owed by them to the company (and the company alone) and 
shall be enforceable in the same way as any otherjiduciary duty owed to 
a company by its directors. '
This means that the employees cannot themselves enforce this 
duty. The company alone is the correct plaintiff in any action.
COMMON LAW
The power of directors to consider the interests of their 
employees is severely limited at common law. In Hutton v West 
Cork Railway Co (1883), Bowen EJ clearly stated that 'there are to 
be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of 
the company'. Unless there is a specific object in the company's 
constitution sanctioning relevant non-commercial activities, it is 
necessary to establish that the activities are reasonably incidental 
or conducive to the carrying out of the company's business. 
Another limiting factor is that a director, in order to fulfil his or 
her fiduciary duty, must believe that the costs of non-commercial 
activities are in the interests of the company, i.e. in the long term 
interests of the shareholders. In Parke v Daily News (1962) 
Plowman J rejected the idea that directors, in having regard to 
the question what is in the best interests of their company, are 
legally entitled to take into account the interests of the 
employees irrespective of any consequential benefit to the 
company. This principle was applied most recently by the Irish 
Supreme Court In The Matter Of Greendale Developments Ltd (In 
Liquidation) (1997). In Heron International Ltd v Lord Grade (1983), 
the Court of Appeal had to consider the nature of directors, 
duties in the context of a takeover situation. The court stated 
that where directors are assessing rival bids in a takeover 
situation, they must make a decision based on the best interests 
of the company. In such a case, 'the interests of the company 
must be the interests of the current shareholders'. No mention 
was made of the interests of the employees.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that implementing theo o * ' r o
provisions of the draft 13th directive safeguarding the rights of 
employees in Ireland would require further legislative change. It 
would also require a change in the current acceptance of the 
domination of the interests of shareholders in corporate decision 
making. Whether such a change is desirable remains to be 
determined.  
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